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Abstract: This paper examines financial claims for lending if banks are permitted to hold 
equity in productive firms. We demonstrate that in situations where an oligopolistic 
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holding by banks is likely to do little damage. However, where the product market has 
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unlikely to hold equity in firms. Our findings provide an alternative argument that lifting 
the Glass-Steagall Act restricting banks from holding equity in firms should give little 
cause for concern.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
In their recent and interesting paper on “Anticompetitive Financial Contracting: 
The Design of Financial Claims,” Cestone and White (2003) presented that a new form 
of entry deterrence takes place through financial rather than product-market channels. 
Their model explains nicely why financial market competition spurs product market 
competition. Their explanation leads an important policy implication that the link 
between financial and product market competition should be stronger where regulation 
permits financiers to hold equity claims in productive firms.   
We do the reverse that product market competition can affect the design of 
financial claims.  The two relevant distinctions for our argument about product market 
competition are: (i) how a productive firm conducts its own market behavior, and thus its 
rival’s optimal response, and (ii) whether its capital decision is reversible or not, where 
irreversibility means that the cost of reversing decisions is prohibitively high. This paper 
presents a model in which banks design financial contracts explicitly incorporating 
productive firms’ conjectural variations with and without entry deterrence if banks can be 
permitted to hold equity in productive firms. This is a new form of financial contract 
which has not previously been considered, but which is nonetheless potentially important 
in imperfectly competitive industries who face difficulties with funding opportunities.   
Sapienza (2002) indicates two related evidences. First, there is a positive 
relationship between concentration and prices in banking. For example, Hannan (1991) 
finds that banks operating in more concentrated local markets charge higher rates on 
loans. Second, large banks tend to lend to large companies, and small banks often 
specialize in lending to small businesses (for example, Peek and Rosengren (1996), and 
Strahan and Weston (1996)). Additionally, Cavalluzzo and Cavalluzzo (1998), and 
Cavalluzzo, Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2002) pointed out that small businesses tend to 
borrow locally rather than nationally, and owners of small ethnic businesses may have 
less access to institutional financing than whites. Rather than emphasizing an interaction 
issue on banking firm’s fund supplying and productive firm’s fund demanding, we argue 
that those evidences raise a link issue on the form of financial claims between banks and 
their borrowers. In situations where there are some difficulties in obtaining funding, a 
firm will generally have an incentive to disadvantage its rivals by selling equity to a bank 
with a comparative advantage in funding sources if regulation permits. In standard 
models of the interaction between product and financial markets, the focus has always 
been on how a productive firm’s use of financial instruments affects its own product 
market competition, and thus its rival’s optimal response.1 By contract, in this paper we 
show that a productive firm’s conjectural behavior has an impact on the design of 
financial claims with the regulatory permission to hold the borrower’s equity. 
Furthermore, this permission is likely to do little damage or increase to the borrower’s 
                                                 
1 The literature on the interaction between product and financial markets is quite extensive. 
Brander and Lewis (1986) abstract from any financial market effects of the design of claims, and 
concentrate on product market effects. Poitevin (1989), Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), Showalter 
(1995), and Spagnolo (2000), for example, have provided models of the interaction between 
product and financial markets based on Brander and Lewis. 
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oligopolistic competition whether or not the borrower’s investment is reversibly costless.  
In this regard, given that product and financial markets are imperfectly competitive, the 
lifting of the Glass-Steagall Act should give little cause for concern. 
Our primary emphasis is the selection of the bank’s optimal loan rate, and thus 
the optimal composition and size of its financial claims when banks are permitted to hold 
equity in productive firms. The literature on bank equity holding firms is relevant to that 
on banking regulation. In particular, financial market competition spurs product market 
competition as pointed out by Cestone and White. De Long (1991) suggests that the 
benefits of financial market power are greater when equity holding is possible. This 
suggestion demonstrates that allowing equity holding might increase the tendency to 
concentration of financial market. Saunders (1994) presents a useful overview of the 
costs and benefits of bank’s equity holding reform. Arping (1999) argues that limited 
bank equity holding in incumbent firms may be procompetitive. A description of the role 
of large equity holding banks in Belgian, German, and Italian industrialization can be 
found in DaRin and Hellman (2002). 
Unlike previous arguments, the model developed here assumes a setting in 
which the bank is subject to firm behavior of conjectural variations and authority 
regulation of capital-to-deposits ratio when equity holding by banks is possible. A 
comparative static result shows that the bank will shift its investments to the loan and 
away from the equity holding in a productive firm by decreasing its loan rate if it realizes 
the conjectural variation increases anticipated by the firm. In addition, the bank will 
decrease its loan rate when the regulatory authority decreases the capital-to-deposits ratio 
under the non-negative marginal risky lending of loan rate. Our results address two 
related issues: stronger cooperation in the product market will strongly discourage equity 
holding in the financial market, and stronger deregulate financial market as well. 
Accordingly, the lifting of the Glass-Steagall Act should give little cause for concern. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the banking firm’s profit 
function of the model. Section 3 constructs the productive firm’s profit function with 
investment decisions that are either costlessly or costly reversible. Section 4 derives the 
solution of model and the comparative static analysis in Section 5. Section 6 presents our 
conclusions. 
2. PROFIT FUNCTION OF A BANKING FIRM 
The model is designed to capture in a minimalist fashion the following 
characteristics of a bank: the rate-setting bank is permitted to hold equity in a productive 
firm through its investment; so the competitive behavior among firms in the imperfectly 
competitive product market directly inferences the bank’s loan rate and thus its interest 
margin. In this section, we assume that all economic decisions are made and values are 
determined with a one-period horizon only. Deposit is renewed each period, based on the 
status of the bank at that time. The bank’s capital structure is also changed at the 
beginning of each period based on the past performance of its assets and its future 
prospects. Our model also assumes that the bank holds no excess on borrowed reserves 
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during the period. At the beginning of the period, the bank has the following balance 
sheet constraint:  
∑ +=++ KDBEL ii                                             (1) 
Where  is the total amount of loans with  borrowers (productive firms),∑= iLL m 2 
i  is borrower ’s amount of loans, i  is the bank holding the amount of equity in 
borrower ,  is a composite risk-default variable denoting the bank’s net position in 
the interbank market,  is the quantity of deposits, and 
L i E
i B
D K  is the stock of equity 
capital. 
For purposes of simplicity, we consider the case in which the bank invests its 
partial funds only in firm . It should be apparent in what follows that this simplicity 
enables us to examine the interaction between product and financial markets and does not 
affect the basic conclusions of the paper. The bank is a lender in the interbank market 
under when , and a borrower when 
i
0>B 0<B . In the interbank market, the bank can 
lend and borrow at a known rate . Our model assumes that R K  is fixed over the period, 
and this equity capital held by the bank is tied by regulation to be a fixed proportion  
of the bank’s deposits, . We assume that the required capital-to-deposits ratio 
 is an increasing function of the total amount of the loans and the equity holding in 
borrower , i , held by the bank at the beginning of the period, . Zarruk 
and Madura (1992) demonstrate that this required minimum capital-to-deposits ratio is 
risk-based.  
q
qDK ≥
q
i EL + 0>′q
The bank with equity holding in productive firm  makes term loans i L  at the 
start of the period, which mature and are paid off at the end of the period. To study the 
loan rate and investment decisions of the bank, the loan demand faced by the bank is 
assumed to be a function of its loan interest rate, , and the expected profit on its 
equity holding in firm , i ,  where ,  and 
. We follow Wong (1997), and Cosimano and McDonald (1998) in assuming that 
the bank has some market power in the lending which implies that , and 
. Accordingly,  and . Thus, we argue that 
the bank faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its loan services. In addition, we 
assume that the demand for loans is a positive function of the expected profit on the 
bank’s equity holding in firm , . Under the agency view, loans are based 
on the borrower’s integrity and financial condition, expected future income, and past 
record of repayment. The factors generally considered by banks to evaluate lending 
practices typically account for the borrower’s profit. Based on rather general assumptions, 
LR
i π ∑= ),(),( iLiiL RLRL ππ 0=jπ ij ≠
mj ∈
0/ <∂∂ Li RL
0/ 22 <∂∂ Li RL 0/ <∂∂ LRL 0/ 22 <∂∂ LRL
i 0/ >∂∂ iiL π
                                                 
2 Bank management must decide what types of loans world be the best for the bank. One 
of the more important considerations in making this decision is the types of customers the 
bank wants to serve. To the practical extent, bank diversify their loan portfolios among 
the various broad categories of loans such as business, consumer, and agricultural and 
strive also for considerable diversification within each of these broad categories. To study 
the interaction between product and financial markets in this paper, the assumption of 
market borrowers is only to limit the productive firms. We, for example, consider this 
limitation for industrial banks.  
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it is reasonable to believe that the lending amount of banks is derived from the expected 
profits of their borrowers. 
In addition to term loans, the bank also invest an equity amount i  of firm i . 
We do not explicitly model why the bank or firm  might go into this investment 
arrangement. One important motivation may be that the arrangement provides 
diversification against a future risk to lend for the bank, and insurance against a future 
inability to borrow. In any case, we do not formalize these effect, but instead just assume 
that i  is a function of the bank’s loan rate and the expected profit on its equity holding 
in firm  as well, . As previously mentioned, small businesses tend to 
borrow locally rather than nationally. The investment demand function i  faced by the 
bank is assumed to be a downward-sloping function of the bank’s expected rate of profit 
return, and thus a positive function of its expected profit, . This 
assumption implies that the bank exercises some monopoly power in investing to firm , 
and tends to reduce its opportunity cost through diversification. Further,  
indicates the redistribution effect of the bank’s earning-asset portfolio. 
E
i
E
i ),( iLii REE π=
E
0/ >∂∂ iiE π
i
0/ >∂∂ Li RE
At any time during the period horizon, the bank’s risky-asset portfolio total 
repayments are: 
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
>++<
=++=
0 risk credit  if )1(
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),,(
iL
iL
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LR
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π
π
π                     (2) 
where  is the repayment from the borrowers, and i  is the repayment from 
its investment to firm . The total repayments from the bank’s risky-asset portfolio are 
equal to both repayments from the above with the credit risk of equal to zero. We argue 
that the repayment from i  is equivalent to the expected profit on the bank’s equity 
holding in firm . We consider sunk costs rather than fixed costs in the productive firm’s 
cost structure in order to impede the establishment of newly productive firms and avoid 
the complication of interim investment repayments. Furthermore, as pointed out by 
Baumol, Panzar, and Willig (1982, pp.289-291), fixed costs are not, and do not give rise 
to entry barriers, while the need to sink costs can be barrier to entry. Our model can be 
extended to include fixed costs, but this required a considerable increase in complexity 
with little added gain in insight. Thus, the repayment form i  is equal to i  since 
sunk costs are no longer a portion of the opportunity cost of production. We will define 
i  in details later when the interaction between product and lending markets are 
analyzed.  
LRL )1( + π
i
E
i
E π
π
When the capital constraint is binding, the bank’s repayments from its 
earning-asset portfolio with holding firm ’s equity is: i
])1
1
()[1( iELq
KRVA −−+++=                                    (3) 
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The total assets to be financed at the start of the period are . They 
are financed partly by demandable deposits. At the start of the period, the bank accepts 
 dollars of deposits and provides depositors with a market rate of return equal to the 
risk-free rate, D .
BEL i ++
D
R 3 We assume that this amount, , is exogenously determined, for 
example, by the kind of customers living in the immediate neighborhood of the bank 
(Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002)). Thus, can be thought of as a degree of the bank’s 
deposit-taking franchise. Since the bank funds fixed-rate investments via variable-rate 
deposits, it is unavoidably exposed to a certain risk. The bank is fully insured by the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and it pays an insurance premium of I  
per dollar of deposit. For purposes of simplicity, the insurance premium is ignored. It 
should be apparent in what follows that this abstraction does not affect the basic 
conclusions of this paper.  
D
D
P
At the end of the period, an audit takes place to determine the composition of 
the bank’s earning-asset portfolio and total costs, and assess its current market value. If 
the value of the bank’s total assets A  is less than its total costs, the FDIC pays out 
AZ − . Otherwise, the bank’s equity holders who retain any residual are obliged to pay 
the depositors. The residual value of the bank after meeting all its debt obligation is the 
value of the bank’s equity capital at the end of the period. Thus, we have 
},0max{ ZAS −=                                                 (4) 
where . We assume that , 
, , and . The bank’s total costs, 
)()()1( iELD ECLCDRZ +++= 0/ >∂∂ LCL
0/ 22 >∂∂ LCL 0/ >∂∂ iE EC 0/ 22 >∂∂ iE EC Z , are 
composed of the deposit payment cost, , administrative loan cost, , 
and administrative cost of holding firm i ’s equity, , respectively. The 
administrative deposit cost and the fixed cost are omitted for simplicity because they will 
have the qualitative effect on the optimal rate settings as the administrative lending costs. 
We also assume that the variable administrative cost functions associated with servicing 
loans and holding firm ’s equity are separable. This assumption is frequently used in 
the literature.
DRD )1( + )(LCL
)( iE EC
i
4
The bank’s objective is to set its loan rate and its expected rate in return of the 
equity holding in firm  in order to maximize the market value of the Black-Scholes 
(1973) function defined in terms of profit or equity. As noted by Santomero (1984), the 
choice of an appropriate goal in modeling the bank’s optimization problem remains a 
controversial issue. The selection of our model’s objective function can follow Crouhy 
and Galai (1991), and Mullins and Pyle (1994). Their models assume that asset and 
deposit markets are perfectly competitive so that quantity settings are the relevant 
behavior models in both markets. However, for our purposes, we develop a bank 
behavior model that integrates the risk conditions of the portfolio-theoretic approach with 
cost considerations with the rate-setting behavioral modes of the firm-theoretic approach. 
i
                                                 
3 As pointed out by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2002), all that really is needed is that D  be less 
than 
R
R , so the bank earns rents on its deposit franchise and will be willing to invest in securities 
to support it.  
4 See, for example, Sealey (1980) 
S.-H. Pao, J.-H. Lin / Financial Claims and Product Market Competition 241 
The objective function at the end of period as described by Equation (4) has the 
contingent claim features, written on the current market value of the bank’s earning assets. 
Specifically, the equity capital of the bank is viewed as a call option on the bank’s risky 
assets. Equity holders are residual claimants on the bank’s risky assets after all the 
obligations have been made.  The net obligations here are defined as the difference 
between Z  and . The strike price of the call option is the book value of the 
bank’s net obligations. When the value of the bank’s risky assets is less than the strike 
price, the value of the equity capital is zero. Since we put no restrictions on the detailed 
characteristics of the earning-asset portfolio, the call option written on the bank’s 
portfolio composition is changed stochastically due to the risk differences between the 
risky assets and the default-free assets in the model. Thus, in the option-pricing valuation, 
the market value of the bank’s equity capital is the call option effectively purchased by its 
stockholders. To illustrate this, we rewrite Equation (4) as: 
BR)1( +
)(]})1
1
()[1({)( 21 dNeELq
KRZdVNS i
μ−−−++−−=                  (5) 
where, 
}ˆ
2
1
]
])1
1
()[1(
{[ln
ˆ
1 2
1 σμσ ++−−++−
=
iELq
KRZ
V
d  
σˆ12 −= dd  
11,
2
1
22 2ˆˆˆ σσρσσσ vvv −+=  
DRR −=μ  
Equation (5) prices the bank’s equity capital in terms of two parts. The first is 
the risk-adjusted present value of the bank’s risky assets expressed by the combined 
standard deviation of the bank’s portfolio return. The second part is the risk-adjusted 
present value of the bank’s net obligations to its initial depositors above and beyond the 
default-free assets associated with its administrative costs. In this objective function, the 
cumulative standard normal distribution of  and  represent the 
risk-adjusted factors of the first and second part, respectively.  is the variance with 
ν  and 1 , which is the instantaneous standard deviation of the rates of return on the 
risky and default-free assets, respectively. 1,v  is the instantaneous correlation 
coefficient between the two earning assets in the bank’s portfolio. 
)( 1dN )( 2dN2σˆ
σˆ σˆ
ρ
μ  is the net spread, 
the difference between the interbank market rate and the promised deposit rate to the 
initial depositors. 
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3. PROFIT FUNCTION OF A PRODUCTIVE FIRM 
In this section, we now analyze bank holding equity in productive firms from 
the viewpoint of outside investor control rather than from the regulations. Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) demonstrate that shareholder activism has traditionally been viewed as a 
benefit to concentrated outside equity, and argue that ownership concentration may 
increase firm value by enhancing the incentives of outsiders to monitor and control 
managers. Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1997) argue that outside equity influence is perhaps 
most prevalent in the relationship between venture capitalists and the firms they finance. 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997), however, point out some costs of large investors in addition 
to distorted management incentives. Fee (2002) emphasizes the effect of venture 
capitalists on managerial incentives and argues that limited outside control may increase 
overall firm value. Our model departs from the trade-offs, and documents an alternative 
on a bank’s holding equity in a productive firm (or, equivalently, capital venture) to 
analyze the interaction between bank lending and firm competition in product market.  
Our argument addresses a crucial issue: what are the most likely effects of the 
firm’s current and potential conjectural variations on its venture capitalist’s profitability 
and risk?  To do this, we consider a particular industry with  identical firms that 
compete with each other and the potential entrant as oligopolistic sellers in a quantity 
variation model. We follow Veendorp (1991) and assume that all firms and the potential 
entrant have the same production, ii , where i  is firm ’s output, 
i  its capital stock, and  its labor input.
n
},min{ iMKQ = Q i
K iM
5 Firms face a linear industry demand 
curve, QaP −= , where , , and ∑= iQQ 0>a P  is the market price. r  and  
are the constant input market prices of the capital stock and labor, respectively. All firms 
must incur a fixed setup cost that is no higher for incumbent firms, , that for the 
potential entrant, . 
w
iF
e
A relevant distinction for our argument is whether the capital decision made by 
firm  is reversible or not. They lead to the following two scenarios. First, firm ’s 
investment cannot serve as an entry deterrent. The profit equations and first-order 
conditions of a representative firm (firm ) and the potential entrant are given by: 
F
i i
i
iiiii FrQwQQQa −−−−= )(π                                    (6-1) 
eeeee FrQwQQQa −−−−= )(π                                  (6-2) 
01 =−−−−+−=′ rwQnQ)Q(na iieii λπ                         (6-3) 
02 =−−−−−=′ rwQnQnQa eeeie λπ                             (6-4) 
where , , and , iji QQ ∂∂= /λ ij ≠ eje QQ ∂∂= /λ ej ≠ .  is the effect that firm iλ
                                                 
5 We use Veendorp’s (1991, pp.298-300) profit functions to analyze the interaction between 
financial and product markets. Veendorp pointed out that firms and the potential entrant produce 
with a fixed-coefficient production function. Fortunately, one obtains essentially similar results 
replacing it by the Cobb-Douglas production function. 
S.-H. Pao, J.-H. Lin / Financial Claims and Product Market Competition 243 
i ’s output will have on the other firms’ outputs. e  is the effect that the potential 
entrant’s output will have on the other firms’ outputs. i  and e  are called the 
conjectural variation terms that each firm has to make some guess or conjecture about 
how the others will react to its output changes. We assume ei . This 
assumption indicates that a symmetric oligopolistic equilibrium exists in pure strategies
λ
λ λ
λλλ ==
6. 
In general, 11 ≤≤− λ . An industry with  identical firms competes with each other 
and the potential entrant as quasi-competitive sellers when 
n
1−=λ , as Cournot-type 
ones when 0=λ , and as collusive ones when 1=λ . Thus, we obtain the equilibrium 
of firm ’s profit  since its optimal amount of output is equal to 
the potential entrant’s, . 
i iii FQn −+= 2)1( λπ
ei
The second scenario in the model is that firm ’s investment serves as an entry 
deterrent. The post-equilibrium is described by Equations (6-2), Equations (6-4), and  
QQ =
i
iiiii FrKwQQQa −−−−= )(π                                    (7-1) 
0)1( =−−−+−=′ wQnQQna iieii λπ                              (7-2) 
0=eπ                                                         (7-3) 
as long as i , where i  is determined by the pre-entry equilibrium. Given this 
setting, firm ’s optimal profit turns out to be . 
i KQ ≤ K
i iiii
Before starting production, firm  can finance production by borrowing the 
money needed to purchase the input bundle. Let ii  be firm i ’s total amount 
borrowed from the bank. For ease of the exposition, in this basic model we assume that 
firm  sells all of its equity to the bank. The bank is only the firm’s venture capitalist 
since firm  anticipates a benefit of concentrated outside equity. This may be the case 
where obtaining funding is very limited. Since there is bilateral monopoly between firm 
 and the bank, we could equally well allow firm  or the bank make take-it-or-leave-it 
offers. The main insight of the model is robust to any distribution of bargaining power. 
More importantly, as pointed out by Cestone and White (2003, p.2110), the form of the 
financial contract between firm  and the bank will affect the bank’s willingness to 
provide funds to the potential entrant, by taking its returns more or less sensitive to the 
effect of product market competition. In the borrowing market, we apply Cavalluzzo, 
Cavalluzzo, and Wolken (2002, p.641) and assume that the firm faces a bank that 
demonstrates loan rate-setting behavior. Accordingly, the firm demonstrates loan 
quantity-setting behavior, given a loan rate set by the bank. 
FrQQn −−+= 2)1( λπ
i
EL +
i
i
i i
i
We consider the case where information is symmetric so all of the money 
borrowed is used for production. Firm ’s production function can be rewritten as 
, with , and .  in Equation (2) can be written as 
i
)( iiii ELQQ += 0>′iQ 0<′′iQ iπ
                                                 
6 For purposes of simplicity, the asymmetric equilibrium is ignored. It should be apparent in what 
follows that this abstraction does not affect the basic conclusions of our paper. 
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                    (8) 
⎪⎩
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=
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2
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i
FrQQn
FQn
λ
λ
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Firm ’s optimal profit in Equation (8) is recognized as the interaction channel 
between product and financial market. This interaction concentrates on product market 
competition effects expressed by conjectural variations and on financial market 
diversification effects expressed by lending portfolio or the design of claims. This 
interaction also shows that the desire for productive entry deterrence is important when 
the bank’s holding equity in incumbent firm  takes place. 
i
i
4. THE OPTIMAL LOAN RATE 
Partially differentiating Equation (5) with respect to loan rate, the first-order 
condition is: 
)(}]1)1[()1({ 1dNR
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where, 
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In order to get tractable equilibrium, a few simplifying assumptions and 
explanations are in Equation (9) are made. First, η  is the interest rate elasticity of loan 
demand evaluated at the optimal loan rate. 1−<η  implies that the bank operates on the 
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elastic portion of its loan demand curve, just as a monopolistic firm does. In addition, the 
two financial products in the risky-asset portfolio, the bank’s lending amount to firm  
and its investment level on holding firm ’s equity, are said to be complements if 
, and substitutes if . For both cases, the term 
. Based on rather general assumptions, it is reasonable to 
believe that the lending from a change in L  (the own effect) is more significant than 
the investment from a change in L  (the cross effect). There are two different ways to 
make this intuitive idea more precise. One of these focuses on the form of the financial 
contract between the bank and the productive firm, the “conglomerate” effects of loan 
rate changes, while the other looks at the “diversification” effects of loan rate changes 
along. 
i
i
0/ <∂∂ Li RE 0/ >∂∂ Li RE
0// <∂∂+∂∂ LiLi RERL
R
R
Second, if factors such as weather influence the amount produced, then 
conjectural variations affect production and, hence, the bank’s desirability of the various 
lending contracts. The first scenario is that firm ’s investment cannot serve as an entry 
deterrent. If the conjecture variation is greater than 
i
n/1− , the expected profit on the 
bank’s equity holding in firm i  is a decreasing function of the loan rate since 
. Intuitively, one way the bank may attempt to augment its expected return 
on equity holding in firm  is by shifting its investments to its lending to firm  and 
away from equity holding. If loan demand is relatively rate-elastic, a larger loan is 
possible at a reduced loan rate. This attempt demonstrates that the lending is preferred to 
the equity holding by the bank. But if 
0/ <∂∂ Li Rπ
i i
n/1−<λ , . This result indicates 
that the equity holding is preferred to the lending by the bank. The logic of the those two 
results is very straightforward since conjectural variations affects the form of financial 
contract designed by the bank even though firm ’s operation cannot serve as entry 
deterrent in its industry. The second scenario is that firm ’s investment serves as an 
entry deterrent. If the conjecture variation is greater 
0/ >∂∂ Li Rπ
i
i
nrn 2//1 +− , the expected profit 
on the bank’s equity holding in firm  is a decreasing function of the loan rate. But if i
nrn 2//1 +−<λ , . The interpretation of these results follows a similar 
argument as in the first scenario.  
0/ >∂∂ Li Rπ
Third, the term δ  in Equation (9) can be treated as the marginal risky lending 
of loan rate. The first term on the right-hand side can be interpreted as the direct loan 
effect, while the second term can be interpreted as the indirect investment return effect. 
The direct loan effect captures the change in the total loan amount due to an increase in 
L , holding the investment decision constant. It is unambiguously negative because the 
bank faces a downward-sloping loan demand curve. The indirect investment return effect 
arises because an increase in L  decreases the bank’s investment return in every 
possible state. Thus, when the bank prefers lending to firm  rather than to the equity 
holding in firm , as stated earlier, the marginal risky lending of loan rate is negative.  
R
R
i
i
The first term associated with  in Equation (9) is the bank’s 
risk-adjusted present value for marginal risky-asset repayments from a change in its loan 
rate. This term indicates that the bank is an imperfectly competitive financial 
intermediary that “produce” two risky products: loan and investment. A product nature 
rather than a conjectural variation demonstrates market conducting when the bank 
recognizes the interdependence between the two products. This recognition allows us to 
rule out cooperative or collusive nature in the multi-product setting. For purposes of the 
)( 1dN
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simplicity, we consider a substitute nature between the two products ( ) to 
analyze the lending decisions. Thus, this risk-adjusted present value is composed of 
loan-rate elasticity of demand, firm ’s productivity, and redistribution factor of the 
bank’s risk-asset portfolio. 
0/ >∂∂ Li RE
i
The second term associated with  in Equation (9) is treated as the 
bank’s risk-adjusted present value for marginal net obligations from a change in its loan 
rate. This term demonstrates the marginal administrative cost of serving risk-asset 
portfolio plus the marginal revenue of borrowing / lending in the interbank market, and 
the reallocation effect between the bank’s lending and investment. 
)( 2dN
The equilibrium condition in Equation (9) shows that the bank’s risk-adjusted 
present value for marginal risky-asset repayments equals its risk-adjusted present value 
for marginal net obligations from a change in its loan-rate setting. This equilibrium 
condition determines both the optimal composition and size of the bank’s earning-asset 
portfolio. In addition, this integrates the risk conditions of the portfolio-theoretic 
approach with the market modes of the firm-theoretic approach. This integrated approach 
in the model follows Sealey (1980) concerning bank rate-setting behavior and 
demonstrates the important effect that the lending determination has on the investment 
decision. 
5. COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS 
Having examined the solution to the bank’s optimization problem, in this section 
we consider the effect on the bank’s optimal loan rate from a change in firm ’s 
conjectural variation in its industry. Implicitly differentiating Equation (9) with respect to 
conjectural variation 
i
λ  yields the following comparative static result: 
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We assume that the second-order condition, , is satisfied. Before 
proceeding with the comparative static analysis of Equation (10), the following terms 
need classified. First, in Equation (10), the first term associated with  captures 
the impact on the bank’s marginal risky-asset repayments from changes in the conjectural 
variation. This term is negative since . The second term associated 
with  demonstrates the impact on the bank’s marginal net obligations from 
changes in the conjectural variation. This term is negative as well. In practice, bank 
0/ 22 <∂∂ LRS
)( 1dN
0/2 <∂∂∂ λπ Li R
)( 2dN
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management is primarily done through a “cost of goods sold” approach in which 
liabilities such as deposits are the “materials” and assets such as loans and investment are 
the “work in process” (see Finn and Frederick (1992)). In our model, the market value of 
the bank’s equity capital is viewed as a call option on its risky assets (work in process in 
Finn and Frederick’s sense) with the strike price of its book-value net obligations 
(materials). Furthermore, the purpose of this paper is to explore the interactions between 
financial and product markets. This allows to us to expect that the impact from 
conjectural variations among the product market on the marginal risky-asset repayments 
is more significant than that on the marginal net obligations. Thus, the difference between 
the two terms is negative. 
Second, we define the term  as the risk 
elasticity effect. Note that the sign for the risk elasticity will be the same as the sign for 
. The first term is the marginal ratio 
to the average cumulative standard normal distribution of 1 . This ratio can be defined 
as the reciprocal distribution elasticity of the risk-adjusted risky-asst repayments. The 
second term 2  follows a similar argument as 1  and is defined as the reciprocal 
distribution elasticity of the risk-adjusted net-obligation payments. The difference 
between the two reciprocal types of elasticity demonstrates the bank’s underlying 
preference or risk magnitude for the market value of equity capital in the Black-Scholes 
(1973) valuation. When the first ratio is greater than the second one, an explanation of 
the positive risk elasticity effect can be offered: the bank has a decreasing risk magnitude 
for its equity return. That is, the bank operates in a good state or a less risky state of the 
world since the risky distribution elasticity of the risky-asset repayments is less 
significant than the risk-default distribution elasticity of the net-obligation payments. 
Similarly, the bank is assumed to operate in a bad or a more risky state when the risk 
elasticity effect is negative. Thirdly, the term  describes the impact on 1  
from a change in the conjectural variation in the product market. The third term in 
Equation (10) is negative since  based on the first order condition, the risk 
elasticity effect is assumed to be positive, and . 
)//())(/)((/ 2211 dNdNdNdN ∂∂−∂∂
)/)(/()/()/)(/()/( 222111 ddNdNddNdN ∂∂−∂∂
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d d
λ∂∂ /1d d
0/ <∂∂ LRV
0/1 >∂∂ λd
We establish the following proposition. 
Proposition 1. An increase in firm ’s conjectural variation decreases the bank’s 
optimal loan rate when the bank operates a less risky state of the world. 
i
Proposition 1 demonstrates the important competitive effect that the bank’s 
investment in firm ’s conjectural variation has on its loan rate. If conjectural variation 
such as quasi-competitive, Cournot-Nash or collusive behavior influences the amount 
produced by firm , then competition affect the bank’s optimal loan rate and, hence, the 
optimal composition and size of the bank’s risk-asset portfolio. Clarke and Davies (1982) 
pointes out that under certain circumstances, it is possible to array industry behavior on a 
spectrum between quasi-competitive and collusive behavior. If the bank realizes that the 
conjectural variation increases anticipated by firm i , for example, from Cournot to 
collusion, the bank will decrease its loan rate. In other words, if the firm  raises output, 
the others will do likewise. The result for both firm  and its industry is equivalent to 
the result of a monopoly. Under the given circumstances, the bank is more willing to shift 
i
i
i
i
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its investments to the loan and away from the equity holding in firm  by decreasing its 
loan rate. If the bank realizes that the conjectural variation decreases expected by firm , 
for example, from Cournot to quasi-competition, the bank will increase its loan rate. 
Accordingly, the bank is more willing to shift its investment to the equity holding in firm 
 and away from the loan. In our model, we can argue that the degree of product market 
competition will affect the bank’s financial contract. The bank facing a relatively less 
competitive industry is more willing to shift its investments to the loan whereas the bank 
facing a relatively higher competitive industry is more willing to shift its investments to 
the equity holding in firm . 
i
i
i
i
Our model can thus also shed light on the debate as to whether banks should be 
permitted to hold equity in firms. In situations where an oligopolistic product market is 
highly competitive in terms of conjectural variations (e.g., quasi-competitive behavior), 
equity holding by banks is likely to do little damage. However, where an oligipolistic 
product market is less competitive (e.g., collusion behavior), equity holding by banks is 
unlikely occur to. This suggests that the link between financial contract design and 
product market competition should be stronger in economies where regulation permits 
financiers to hold equity claims in productive firms. 
In addition, the two scenarios presented in this paper is whether or not firm ’s 
investment serves as an entry deterrent. With and without firm ’s investment decisions 
that are costly reversible, and a fixed coefficient production technology, we argue that an 
increase in firm ’s conjectural variation decreases the bank’s optimal loan rate as 
shown in Proposition 1. Accordingly, whether firm ’s investment decision is reversible 
or not, equity holding by the bank is likely to do little damage as well. 
i
i
i
i
A related question is to condition the impact of an increase in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio on the bank’s optimal loan rate. Implicit differentiation of 
Equation (9) with respect to  yields: q
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Since , an explanation of the results from Equation (11) is possible terms of 
the marginal risky lending evaluated at the bank’s optimal loan rate, 
0/1 <∂∂ qd δ , as discussed 
previously. The first term associated with  represents the bank’s marginal net 
obligation from changes in the capital-to-deposits ratio. The sign of this first term is 
determined by 
)( 2dN
δ . For example, if 0=δ  (and thus Li  must be positive), the 
bank’s marginal net obligation is invariant with changes in the regulatory capital 
requirement. The second term associated with  captures the risk elasticity effect 
on the bank’s profit from a change in . This second term is positive. The effect on the 
bank’s loan rate from an increase in  is positive when 
R∂∂ /π
qd ∂∂ /1
q
q 0≥δ . Intuitively, as the bank 
is forced to increase its capital relative to its deposit level, it must now provide a return to 
a larger equity base. One way the bank may attempt to augment its total returns is by 
shifting its investments to its equity holding in firm  and away from the loan. We can 
establish the following proposition. 
i
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Proposition 2. When the marginal risky lending evaluated at the optimal loan rate is 
non-negative, an increase in the capital-to deposits ratio increases the bank’s loan rate. 
 This proposition is valid under the condition of 0≥δ . Consequently, this 
condition is governed by Li . Note that the term Li  must be positive and 
significantly large to ensure the non-negative 
R∂∂ /π R∂∂ /π
δ . With firm ’s investment that is costly 
reversible, its conjectural variation is less than and equal to 
i
n/1−  and thus 
. However, when firm ’s investment is costly reversible, the conjectural 
variation is less than and equal to 
0/ ≥∂∂ Li Rπ i
nrn 2//1 +− . We argue that given the same degree 
of firm ’s conjectural variations in both scenarios of our model, increases in the 
capital-to-deposits ratio may not encourage the bank to shift investments to its equity 
holding in firm  and from its loan. Therefore, equity holding by the bank is likely to do 
damage from the capital regulation viewpoint. 
i
i
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we have drawn attention to a new channel through which banks 
are permitted to hold equity in productive firms. The results imply that changes in the 
productive firm’s conjectural variations have a direct effect on the bank’s optimal loan 
rate (and thus the optimal composition and the size of its earning-asset portfolio) . In 
particular, Proposition 1 shows that an increase (decrease) in a productive firm’s 
conjectural variation decreases (increases) the bank’s optimal loan rate. The analysis 
suggests that even though the bank is permitted to hold equity in the product firm, the 
bank is not likely to hold equity if the conjectural variation increases whereas equity 
holding by the bank is likely to do little damage if the conjectural variation decreases.  
The results also imply that changes in the bank’s regulatory parameters, such as 
capital-to-deposits ratio, have a direct effect on the bank’s optimal loan rate. Our analysis 
suggests that if banks are permitted to hold equity in productive firms, an increase in the 
regulatory capital-to-deposits ratio encourages the bank to increasingly hold equity in 
firm  and decreasingly operate its lending. Thus, an important result of our paper is 
that capital regulation creates bank incentives to fund productive firms’ equity, rather 
than to lend whether firm investment is costly reversible or not.    
i
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